


AU/ACSC/2016

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

FALLING STARS:
WHY SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS FAIL



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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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5 Preface


Since the start of my career, I have seen over 55 senior military leaders fail in one way or another. Several of these were leaders that I highly respected and still do. I began to ask myself how I could succeed in my career if so many others had significant failures contrasting against their backgrounds of success. How could I prevent failure in my own career? As I began to research the topic for personal interest, I found a plethora of information on leadership success. However, I found almost no information on the study of leadership failures and its prevention, and much less on military-specific failures.

I evaluated senior military leadership failure with a holistic view instead of focusing on the individuals. While the paper briefly mentions individuals, it attempts to minimize details surrounding each individual's situation to ensure a focus on observations and trend analyses. Joint Publication (JP) 1 emphasizes force development and involves, "collecting observations, analyzing them, and taking the necessary steps to turn them into 'learned lessons' – changes in behavior that improve the mission ready capabilities of the joint force. Properly assessed, these positive and negative observations help senior leaders identify and fix problems [and] reinforce success."¹ This assessment is intended only to help current and future leaders. I do not intend to demean or cause further harm to the subject or those impacted by the subject's [in]actions. Forced terminations in non-military career fields are linked to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). In studies of failures in the clergy, some are demeaned, both publicly and privately, to the point where ministers resign due to psychological

¹ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013.

pressure. This negativity does not cease after abdication and results in degraded health, family well-being, self-confidence, and financial stability.² To minimize negative impacts and focus on results, only a few individual's cases are described.

Since this is a group study rather than a case study, I had to create an extensive database on all known senior military leadership failures dating back to 1925. When I undertook this project, I had no idea just how extensive the database would become. Therefore, I must thank my husband, Will, for his endless patience and tireless parenting skills. I also greatly appreciate our daughter, Victoria, and our baby-on-the-way for making the best of my distracted time. Ultimately, inspiration came from my mom, Janine, and my late grandfather, Jim, who always reminded me to perform my best. Of course, this paper would not exist without the continued reviews of my classmates and two research advisors: Dr. Marcia Ledlow and Dr. Richard Smith.



² Marcus N. Tanner, Jeffrey N. Wherry, and Anisa M. Zvonkovic, "Clergy Who Experience Trauma as a Result of Forced Termination," *Journal of Religious Health* 52, (2013): 1281-1295.

6 Abstract

Since 1925, United States leadership demoted, relieved, or forced into retirement at least 109 senior military leaders due to their actions or lack thereof. Of those leaders, 72 occurred within the last fifteen years. These leaders included an Air Force Chief of Staff,³ United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM),⁴ and Air Force Judge Advocate General.⁵ Faced with multiple contingency operations and a restrained fiscal environment, the US must develop and retain its best leaders. Trends of leadership failure generated from a newly developed database were evaluated against current theories of executive, corporate, and military operation failure. The results obtained on senior military leaders differed from the current failure theories. Thus, several revised theories and recommendations were developed. This research determined general/flag officers incur so many adverse personnel actions due to military-specific culture and regulations, such as those on extramarital affairs, leadership accountability, and the all-encompassing role of military life upon the leader's personal life. Future senior leaders can avoid pitfalls by acknowledging the challenges and changes that power brings, incorporating regular self- and peer-assessments of their personal and professional lives, staying current with generational differences, and balancing authority and responsibility.

³ Inspector General, "Alleged Misconduct: General T. Michael Moseley," 10 July 2009. Document is now redacted.

⁴ Inspector General, "Report of Investigation: General William E. Ward," 26 June 2012. Document is now redacted.

⁵ Inspector General of the Air Force, "Report of Investigation (S6567P): Maj Gen Thomas J. Fiscus," October 2004. Document is now redacted.

7 Introduction

Gen David H. Petraeus successfully retired from the military as Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and became the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2012.¹ After resigning due to allegations in 2012, he eventually pled guilty in 2015 to possessing “documents and materials containing classified information of the United States, and did unlawfully and knowingly remove such documents and materials without authority and with the intent to retain such documents and materials at unauthorized locations.”² This resulted in two years on probation and a \$100,000 fine.³ While his personal sentence was great, the impact to the US was much greater. In addition to the security threat from leaked information, the US lost future contributions of one of the most influential commanders in recent history.

Over 100 general/flag officers have incurred serious adverse personnel actions since 1925, and over 70 of those have recently occurred since 2000 while the US was engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. These leaders included an Air Force Chief of Staff,⁴ US AFRICOM Commander,⁵ and Air Force Judge Advocate General.⁶ US and Department of Defense (DoD) leadership demoted, relieved of command, or even forced resignation upon general/flag officers due to substantiated allegations of extramarital affairs, inadequate direction that resulted in the loss of life, or improper use of government funds. In other cases, this leadership took action against general/flag officers with less significant and/or unsubstantiated allegations. Emerging leaders must learn from these past issues to serve the American people with effective and ethical leadership. Therefore, this research paper asks: Why have general/flag officers incurred so many adverse personnel actions, and how can future senior leaders avoid these mistakes?

For an organization that promotes ethical behavior inside and out of the workplace, the majority of the documented DoD cases in 2000 to 2015 were due to serious ethical/moral lapses. Based on this research, disciplinary actions due to these lapses were rare prior to 1999 (Figure 1 in blue). Performance errors represented nearly a third of the cases in the last 15 years; however, that percentage is half of the preceding 74 years (Figure 1 in red). Perhaps the measurements of success have changed over the last 90 years.




Figure 1: Percentage of Major Infraction Types Listed from 1925 to 2015

Volumes of books and articles abound on successful leadership, yet few exist on the study of leadership failures. Even less information exists on operational failures within the unique climate of the DoD, and almost no information exists on military leadership failures or the drastic change in failure modes. Some of the most widely accepted theories on failure do not adequately explain this ongoing phenomenon with military leadership, such as those by Sydney Finkelstein, Peter Feaver, and Eliot Cohen. Several theories are evaluated and

combined/modified to describe leadership failures in the DoD, after which recommendations are provided.

Therefore, the evaluation framework was used to compare data and trends identified through this research alongside current theories on military, corporate, and leadership failure. Trends from this research emerged that countered current theories of failure, such as the existing research on industrial and organizational psychology, theories on executives, or even theories on corporate failure.^{7,8,9, 10,11} Not only does this research provide significant insight into the prevalence of discovery and punishment of wrongdoing, it lays the foundation for more in-depth analysis into specific cases. While leadership success studies typically all cite similar traits, the modes of failure are much more complex.

This paper contends that the unique militaristic leadership climate prohibits traditional failure theory application and recommends the development of a new framework. Additionally, a few revised theories are proposed, and recommendations are provided. Without drastic changes to policy, training, and/or culture, the stars will continue to fall.

8 Background

This research paper analyzes over 100 general/flag officers (defined as O-7 to O-10) who committed major infractions since 1925, and it emphasizes the last 15 years. Figure 2 shows the number of known general/flag officers who incurred major infractions for each year. As shown, the last 15 years have had an unprecedented number of incidents. Other parts of the research period are void of these punitive actions. To determine the primary issues behind these significant personnel actions (or lack thereof), reports from the various Inspector Generals' (IG) offices were gathered, analyzed, and populated into a database for analysis. This consolidated

data was reviewed and compared to the social and militaristic climate. However, many assumptions were required due to data access restrictions and other such limitations.




Figure 2: Number of O-7 to O-10 Personnel with Major Infractions Listed by Year

8.1 Assumptions and Limitations

This analysis covers major infractions by general/flag officers (O-7 to O-10) of the US DoD. It does not discuss civilian instances due to scope and data access limitations. This report defines a major infraction as one reported publicly by a released IG report and/or a news report. If a case did not warrant a publicly available IG report and/or news story, then the case was considered minor and was not included. Inspector General reports released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) comprise the majority of research sources due to their presumed

factual nature. However, not all IG reports are readily available, and individual Service IG reporting varies greatly. News reports were used in cases where IG reports were unavailable. Since personnel files are inaccessible due to the Privacy Act, most cases do not have the personnel outcomes linked to the infraction. Additionally, IG reports do not typically capture political issues (visionary disconnects). The news media does highlight these issues, but the sources can be biased or operating on assumptions. Many performance-related IG reports are classified and not releasable; these were not included in the analysis.

Since many infractions spanned multiple years, the reporting date is the date used for analysis. This allows consistency, even though it is not entirely representative. Due to data and reporting limitations, the analysis focuses on 2000 to 2015. Reputable data prior to 2000 is inconsistently available, which decreases the group study reliability of that period. However, the report does consider infractions dating back to 1925 partially due to the infamous case of Brig Gen Billy Mitchell, and it continues to the present.

8.2 Historical Status

In 1925, Brig Gen Billy Mitchell, one of the greatest proponents of air superiority, received a court martial and was convicted for insubordination. He was charged with “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline and in a way to bring discredit upon the military service.”¹² Rather than face a suspension, he resigned. The ultimate cause of his eventual resignation was a visionary disconnect with his superiors. He blamed the Navy and others for “incompetence and criminal negligence,” and he told the press, “Brave airmen are being sent to their deaths by armchair admirals who don't care about air safety.”¹³ His

predictions and service were instrumental to the future US Air Force but cost him his career.

Similar visionary disconnects continued to occur up to the present.

In 1940-1941, Adm James Richardson, Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, vehemently opposed fleet movement associated with Pearl Harbor, which led to his removal. His memoir has an entire chapter entitled, “I Get out of Step with the President: Reason for my Early Relief as Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet.” He recalled stating, “Mr. President, I feel that I must tell you that the senior officers of the Navy do not have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific.”¹⁴ Other 1940’s leadership changes were due to visionary disconnects. The 1949 “Revolt of the Admirals” led to the removal and retirements of Adm Louis E. Denfeld, Adm William H. P. Blandy, and Adm Gerald P. Bogan after their fight against the creation of the Air Force B-36 bomber.¹⁵

While the 1940’s were full of performance and visionary failures, the 1950’s were less notable. The main event was when President Harry S. Truman relieved Gen Douglas MacArthur in 1951 due to policy clashes and suspected insubordination.¹⁶ Otherwise, there were no significant personnel changes for the remainder of the 1950’s or the 1960’s (see Figure 3). The 1970’s and 1980’s brought performance-related failures associated with the Vietnam War (My Lai Massacre), the Iran-Contra Affair, and other Cold War-related issues. Until the 1990’s, there were no known personnel changes due to ethical or moral failures (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Number of O-7 to O-10 Personnel Listed by Infraction Type, 1925 - 1999

The 1990's demonstrated a drastic change in the types of offenses. Known adverse personnel actions became predominately due to ethical and moral lapses (Figure 3). The decade started with the 35th Annual Symposium of the Tailhook Association (also known as *Tailhook 1991*), which resulted in over 90 identified indecent assault victims.¹⁷ Since there were no known ethical cases prior to the 1990's, this incident may have shifted some accountability focus to the general/flag officers' personal lives instead of performance. Other than Adm Richard Dunleavy, who allowed Tailhook to occur, there were no known and substantiated allegations of senior military leaders until 1995.¹⁸

In the wake of Tailhook, the media may have also directed attention to more “scandalous” news to boost sales. Additionally, the home computer and internet may have affected reporting or consumer access. The first known prosecuted case of sexual impropriety was that of Vice Adm Ralph Tindal, who had an affair with an enlisted woman in 1995.¹⁹ In 1997, Gen Joseph Ralston had an extramarital affair and lost his nomination for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁰ Several other general/flag officers incurred substantiated allegations of a sexual nature in the 1990’s; however, the next 15 years consisted of a mixture of performance, ethical/moral, and visionary disconnect failure issues. These issues comprise the basic analysis classifications for this paper to evaluate failure causes against theories.

9 Methodology and Evaluation Criteria

As described in Section 8.1, IG reports were the first source utilized, where possible, to create a database of general/flag officers along with their substantiated allegations. The substantiated allegations within each report were divided into three classifications: moral and ethical errors, performance faults, and visionary disconnects that led to prosecution. Moral and ethical errors include extramarital relationships, sexual harassment, assault, stealing, racist behavior, and similar acts. Performance faults include improper command decisions, poor treatment of subordinates, and mission failures. Visionary disconnects were the most difficult to identify since they typically do not appear in IG reports. Instead, news reports were reviewed to determine if and where these leadership clashes occurred. This database was used to graph the issues by year, issues by rank, and other comparisons to evaluate potential reasons for leadership change.

9.1 Moral and Ethical Errors

Moral and ethical error identification criteria were derived directly from the IG reports and consist of direct sexual acts or instances of personal gain. Examples of these substantiated allegations included “engaged in an inappropriate relationship,” “improperly used government resources,” “had an adulterous relationship,” “sexually harassed female subordinates,” “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” “improperly accepted gifts,” and “provided false and misleading testimony.” Although some of these allegations appear vague, the IG reports provide clarification on the infraction’s nature and the supportive regulations.

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2909, *Professional and Unprofessional Relationships*, immediately highlights in Paragraph 1 the greater importance of maintaining professional relationships in the military than in the civilian realm:

Professional relationships are essential to the effective operation of all organizations, both military and civilian, but the nature of the military mission requires absolute confidence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders that may result in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, injury or death. This distinction makes the maintenance of professional relationships in the military more critical than in civilian organizations.²¹

This instruction further details fraternization, dating and close personal relationships, and relationships between the various types of employees and contractors. Other Services have similar regulations. One of the specific prohibitions prosecutable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 134 is that “officers will not engage in sexual relations with or date enlisted members.”²² It further describes how the “senior member in a personal relationship bears primary responsibility for maintaining the professionalism of that relationship.”²³ UCMJ Article 134 further states, “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,

and crimes and offenses not capital...shall be punished at the discretion of that court.”²⁴ The Services hold military members to a higher standard of ethical and moral behavior than in the civilian private industry due to mission importance. Therefore, unethical and immoral leadership behavior is defined for this paper as “the organizational process of leaders acting in a manner inconsistent with agreed upon standards of character, decency, and integrity, which blurs or violates clear, measurable, and legal standards, fostering constituent distrust because of personal self-interest.”²⁵ While this type of ethical error accounts for the majority of adverse personnel actions since 2000, performance failures still account for nearly one-third of the actions.

9.2 Performance Faults

Performance failures account for approximately a third of the major infractions after 2000. The identification criteria were derived directly from the IG reports and consist of job-related actions or inactions. Examples of these substantiated allegations included “failed to foster a healthy command climate,” “failed to treat subordinates with dignity and respect,” “failed to fulfill leadership responsibilities,” “underestimated the threat posed by the enemy’s capabilities,” “overestimated US and coalition capabilities,” “failed to achieve the coalition unity of effort,” and “loss of trust and confidence in leadership.” Where vague, the IG reports provide clarification on the infraction’s nature and supportive regulations. Additionally, each Service has regulations and instructions for its leadership. For instance, Army Regulation (AR) 600-100 lists responsibilities that every leader must fulfill in Paragraph 2-1; some of these responsibilities include:

- Accomplish the unit mission.
- Ensure the physical, moral, personal, and professional wellbeing of subordinates.
- Treat subordinates with dignity, respect, fairness, and consistency.

- Foster a healthy command climate.²⁶

Included among these regulations on leadership performance are instructions for moral and ethical behavior. However, those issues are segregated as previously defined. Although moral/ethical failures and performance issues are the predominant failure categories of general/flag officers, a few cases do not match these two categories.

9.3 Visionary Disconnect

Visionary disconnect failures account for a small minority of the major infractions of 2000 to 2015. The identification criteria were derived from multiple sources due to the political nature of the issues. Many of these cases are associated with “inappropriate public comments,” whether substantiated or not. In some instances, there was a civil-military relation problem, while there was a principal-agent issue in others (see Section 11.3.2 for more information). Joint Publication 1-0 states, “As prescribed by higher authority, DoD will maintain and employ Armed Forces to...uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the US.”²⁷ In some of these visionary disconnect cases, the general/flag officer appeared to personally conflict with established policies, which led to the adverse action.

10 Results of Evaluation

In an analysis of 1925 to 2015, 109 known general/flag officers incurred major infractions due to ethical/moral, performance, or visionary issues (see Section 14 for a list of these cases). Seventy-two of those officers’ actions occurred only in the last 15 years (2000 to 2015). As shown in Figure 1, the majority of recent issues were ethical/moral; however, performance-related issues were more common preceding 1999. Approximately a third of the

recent cases were performance-related, and a small percentage were due to visionary disconnects. Figure 1 shows this disparity of error types in the two distinguished periods.

To determine what factors may have affected the infraction type, the database was used to create graphs of the information to help identify trends. Figure 2 showed all known personnel with major infractions by year since 1925. Since the number of issues was increasing, the database was broken into the different Services: Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy. The number of infractions by Service was then graphed according to year to determine if a particular Service incurred more infractions. Figure 4 shows the number of known general/flag officers with these issues by year.




Figure 4: Number of O-7 to O-10 Personnel with Major Infractions

As shown in Figure 4, the Army has a fairly consistent higher number of instances over the other Services (see Section 15 for information on the other Services). The peak years were 2012, 2013, and 2007, respectively. However, the Army also has more general officers than the other Services, although the Air Force has a comparative number. Therefore, the number of general/flag officer infractions was compared to each Services' number of general/flag officers to determine a percentage of infractions. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense provided studies on demographics for only 2003 to 2014.^{28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39}

Figure 5 shows each Service's percentage of infractions by year.




Figure 5: Percent of Senior Officer Personnel with Major Infractions

The Army still has a significantly larger percentage of infractions in several years than the other Services with peak years still of 2012, 2013, and 2007. Due to this, the database of Army infractions was classified and graphed according to infraction type. Figure 6 shows the number of Army personnel in each year who had substantiated allegations of each type: ethical/moral, performance, or visionary.




Figure 6: Number of O-7 to O-10 Army Personnel by Infraction Type

Figure 6 shows that ethical/moral issues dominated followed by performance failures. The only year where performance issues outnumbered ethical ones was 2007. Visionary issues outnumbered both ethical and performance failures in 2011. Next, the Army's infractions were

segregated by officer grade to determine if rank influenced these numbers. Figure 7 shows the number of O-7 to O-10 senior officers with infractions by year.




Figure 7: Number of O-7 to O-10 Army Personnel with Major Infractions

Figure 7 shows O-7 Army personnel had a few more issues over the years than the other ranks; however, there are more O-7 personnel in the Army than the higher ranks. There are usually about 150 O-7, 100 O-8, 50 O-9, and 12 O-10 personnel in the Army per year according to the 2003 to 2014 demographics reports. Therefore, the number of infractions per year was graphed according to the Army rank percentage in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Percent of Army Senior Officers with Major Infractions Listed by Year

While Figure 8 makes the O-10 rank appear more susceptible to issues than other ranks, there were only one to two O-10 incidents in the years shown. The low number of O-10 senior officers makes the sample size too small for a direct comparison to the other ranks. Therefore, no conclusion is drawn on the rank of Army personnel infractions.

Although no conclusion based on Army senior officer rank can be reached, the overall trend is interesting. For the Army, instances began to increase in 2004 with a peak in 2007. Again, instances began to increase in 2011 and peaked in 2012. Regardless of Service, the trend was similar. Figure 2 shows that the worst recent years were 2007, 2012, and regardless of Service. The only other comparable year in history was 1943. Although this data set is limited,

it implies leadership or other forces above the Service level significantly influence accountability actions.

Because 1943, the worst year for senior officer issues prior to 2000, was in the middle of World War II, it was theorized that military conflicts impact performance and visionary disconnect issues. Therefore, performance and visionary disconnects were compared according to year (Figure 9). Once again, 2004, 2007, and 2011 to 2013 exceed other years for performance issues. Visionary issues only occurred in 2008, 2009, and 2011.




Figure 9: Types of O-7 to O-10 Major Infractions Listed by Year

Periods of conflict were analyzed alongside these performance and visionary disconnect infractions to determine if periods of success, failure, beginning, or ending affected these

general/flag officers negatively (Figure 10). The visionary disconnects primarily occurred toward the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn (OND) or in the middle of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The majority of performance-based adverse personnel actions occurred toward the end of OEF and throughout Freedom's Sentinel. However, these issues were not necessarily related to the conflicts. For instance, two of the 2014 to 2015 performance infractions occurred due to the Veteran's Affairs hospital issues.⁴⁰




Figure 10: Major Infractions by Conflict Period

Ethical infractions often rose and fell in relation to performance infractions. Additionally, the peak years occurred in every Service similarly. The trends implied a relationship to a cause outside of the Services. Therefore, it was theorized that the greatest

number of adverse personnel actions occurred in relationship to years of peak senior officer membership. According to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense demographic reports (2003 to 2014), the highest number of senior officers employed occurred in 2009 to 2011 (highlighted in Table 1). In the highest year (2010), there were 46 more senior officers employed than the average year. In 2012 and 2013, the number of senior officers across the board declined, which match the years of peak adverse personnel action. In 2014, the number of senior officers in each Service was below the average for the period of 2003 to 2014. This implies that significant adverse personnel actions occurred as part of a reduction in the senior officer ranks. However, the 2014 level has not reached the 2004 nadir.

Table 1: General/Flag Officer Demographics Listed by Year

Year	Total	AF Total	Navy Total	Marines Total	Army Total
2014	918	289	228	83	318
2013	950	305	236	83	326
2012	950	304	237	89	320
2011	976	317	249	88	322
2010	984	315	252	91	326
2009	972	315	243	85	329
2008	929	293	231	87	318
2007	910	286	224	84	316
2006	913	287	225	83	318
2005	893	273	221	80	319
2004	880	274	212	81	313
2003	888	277	212	80	319

If the trend of reduced senior officers continues toward the 2004 nadir along with a relative number of adverse personnel actions, then the data may better support this hypothesis. Without further data, other explanations for these were considered. The previous charts and theories focused on performance and visionary disconnect issues, so the proceeding evaluation focuses on ethical and moral lapses.

Of the ethical and moral infractions, there were two further subcategories: sex-related infractions and personal gain infractions. Instances of a sexual nature included sexual harassment, inappropriate relationships, and sexual assault. Personal gain failures included misusing government resources and improperly accepting gifts. A few cases fall outside these two subcategories with issues such as public nudity, racism, and public drunkenness. The two subcategories were separated for further analysis without accounting for the few outliers. In Figure 11, the number of personal gain infractions is shown by year, regardless of Service.




Figure 11: Number of Major Personal Gain Infractions by Year

The previously discussed peak periods of 2007 and 2012 still exist. One hypothesis was that periods of business cycle expansion and retraction might influence senior officers to commit

offenses for personal gain. However, the data does not appear to support this hypothesis. For instance, the December 2007 to June 2009 recession period only had two incursions.⁴¹ The March to November 2001 downturn had zero known major personal gain issues.⁴² Figure 11 shows this unlikely relationship. Some of the 2011 and 2012 instances might have been related to the periods of recession but delayed due to the investigation process, but confirming this would require additional study.

Since economic downturns do not appear directly related to fiscal improprieties, Figure 12 compares fiscal problems by rank to determine if particular ranks are additionally susceptible. Maybe new general/flag officers felt a sudden privilege with the additional rank, or maybe O-10 level officers felt impervious to accountability. However, the numbers are inconsistent with rank-induced financial errors. Instead, 2007, 2012, and 2015 stand out against the other years.






Figure 12: Number of O-7 to O-10 with Major Personal Gain Infractions

Since financial gain issues were inconsistent with rank ideas, ethical/moral issues of a sexual nature were analyzed to see if certain years were worse regardless of Service (Figure 13). Once again, 2012 is one of the worst years; however, there were no known sexual-related incidents in 2007. Instead, 2013 was equal with 2012, and 2005 and 2014 trailed slightly behind. This suggests a different trend than those previously explored.




Figure 13: Total Number of O-7 to O-10 Sex-Related Infractions

In 2004, sexual assault reports from Kuwait and Iraq spurred Donald H. Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, to order a review of the reporting process.⁴³ Tailhook did not appear to influence inappropriate sexual behavior accountability as immediately as Rumsfeld's memo. Therefore, the overall number of sexual harassment/assault reports per year was compared to general/flag officer incidents. Due to a lack of data on how general/flag officer incidents are reported to the US DoD Sexual Assault and Prevention Response (SAPR) Office, the number of subject reports included in Figure 14 is likely higher than actual. This is due to included consensual extramarital affairs and similar cases (see Section 9.1 for more details).

To create Figure 14, the “Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military” for years 2004 to 2014 were used to determine the total number of victim reports by year.^{44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54} Alongside that number is the percentage of general/flag officer subjects (offenders) researched during this analysis. There are several years where a relationship between victim numbers and subject percentages potentially exists. While it appears that the number of victims is steadily increasing, the SAPR Office believes that this trend is due to increased reporting, not increased incidents. If a relationship does exist between increasing victim reporting and the percentage of subject reports, this potentially means general/flag officers are held accountable in a manner similar to lower ranks.




Figure 14: DoD Sexual Victim/Subject Reporting

Given a database of 109 senior military officers with major infractions, of which 72 were recent, an evaluation identified several trends. First, adverse personnel actions against these officers most closely related to a potential overall attempt to reduce leadership across the Services back to pre-2007 levels. This may be related to the closure of OIF, OND, and OEF. Therefore, this trend may continue until senior officer levels reach pre-2004 levels, as shown in Table 1. However, the Army, which had some of the highest number of infractions, retained the closest number of general officers to average. Due to actions in 2012 and 2013, the Army's number of general officers is already back to pre-2004 levels.

Second, targeted action by senior leadership and the SAPR Office since 2004 appears to have resulted in senior officer accountability. While Tailhook may have initiated senior officer accountability after 1991, the Rumsfeld memo of 2004 truly spurred action against sexual harassment, assault, and other forms of inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature. Additionally, the number of senior officer incidents appears proportional to the number of total number of victim reports for several years. If this is indeed the case, then senior officers may be proportional offenders with proportional accountability.

Although the prevalence of senior leadership failure aligns most closely with military-specific reasons, the evaluation results were compared to current failure theories. Even though the senior officers may have incurred serious repercussions, they also acted in inappropriate ways. What caused them to act in a manner incongruous with military service?

11 Analysis of Results Compared to Failure Theories

The holistic view of general/flag officer failures was evaluated against several of the leading failure theories. Since there are no known theories on senior military leadership failure,

the research database and evaluation results were compared to four popular theories: public perception, executive failure, militaristic failure, and corporate failure. Executive failure theories cover why individuals in corporations fail. Current militaristic theories are derived from military mission failures, not failures of the individuals. Similarly, corporate failure theories summarize why corporations as a whole decline. Leading experts in the respective fields developed these three theory types, while public perception includes reasons typically cited by those with little-to-no expertise in the subject.

11.1 Public Perception

Many public perceptions exist as to why senior executives and leaders fail, and due to their inaccuracy, these misperceptions must be dispelled. Dr. Sydney Finkelstein, management professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, summarized these perceptions as ignorance and/or low intelligence, a failure to predict, a failure to execute, inadequate effort, a lack of leadership ability, insufficient resources, and/or an inherently dishonest and greedy nature.⁵⁵ Although these reasons appear logical with a cursory glance, research does not support them. Since leadership failures do not align with public perceptions, military leadership failure trends are evaluated against some of the leading theories. These theories are divided into executive failures, militaristic failures, and corporate failures.

11.2 Executive Failure Theories

Executive failure theories encompass the various ways senior executives in the private sector falter individually or lead their organizations down a fatally incorrect path. Sydney Finkelstein, David Dotlich, and Peter Cairo are three of the leading theorists in the field. Several

additional theories are presented based on various studies; however, these studies are limited in scope.

11.2.1 Finkelstein

Finkelstein theorizes that there are seven categories of corporate executive failure. The first is that leaders believe they dominate their environment, and that they alone are responsible for success. The next is that they lack boundaries between their personal interests and that of their organization. They also commonly display omniscient behavior and attempt to control everything possible. They may attempt to eliminate opposition, including that of their subordinates. Others emphasize their image to the point where they focus on themselves or only the corporate details that reinforce their self-image. Underestimating challenges may lead to escalated commitments, even when confronted with decision-influencing information. Finally, these failed leaders may have relied on their experiences and defining moments of their careers rather than judge each situation individually.⁵⁶

Finkelstein's theory parallels several of the leadership failures identified in the newly developed leadership database but not as expected. Within the DoD, leaders are explicitly responsible for success, regardless of environmental factors. According to the *Air Force Volume I – Basic Doctrine*, “decentralized execution is defined as the ‘delegation of authority to designated lower-level commanders’;” however, centralized control does not delegate responsibility.⁵⁷ Two recent cases of this are the exposed issues with the Veteran's Health Administration at Walter Reed and other medical facilities, as well as the attack at Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) in Afghanistan.^{58,59}

In the case of the BLS attack, the investigating officials concluded that Maj Gen Charles M. Gurganus “maintained overall command responsibility for RC(SW) and knew, or should have known, of the force protection risks. ...[He] failed to adequately provide command direction and oversight to ensure his subordinates took appropriate actions to effectively mitigate the identified vulnerabilities.”⁶⁰ Similarly, the investigation concluded that Maj Gen Gregg A. Sturdevant “failed to provide adequate command direction and oversight” as well as “failed to simultaneously address the inherent responsibility of commanders at every echelon to provide security and protection for their forces.”⁶¹ The DoD inherently requires military commanders to dominate the internal and external environment as well as bear sole responsibility for success. However, this is one of Finkelstein’s methods of corporate executive failure. Either Finkelstein’s theory is incomplete for the military or performance failures are inevitable for some DoD leaders.

Finkelstein’s belief that another route of leadership failure is the blurred line between the leader’s life and that of the organization parallels military senior leadership failures. Gen Kip Ward notoriously misused his position for personal gain. However, he testified, “whenever his wife flew on MilAir, it was for official purposes. He added that in no case did she fly on MilAir for primarily personal reasons.”⁶² Supporting that claim, one witness “testified that when Mrs. Ward traveled to Africa she often worked on quality of life issues that impacted DoD personnel assigned to the U.S. embassies.”⁶³ However, another witness claimed that “every trip [redacted] planned was an ‘ethics nightmare’ that required [redacted] to ‘swim the waters and know the code’.”⁶⁴ Regardless of whether General Ward knowingly violated DoD regulations, the investigation recommended additional guidance and/or training to clarify travel and gift policies.

When the military fully encompasses the leader's life, to the point where even spouses may act in an official manner, the line between the member's personal life and that of the Service is not explicitly clear. Additionally, military service members may have every aspect of their personal lives scrutinized, as is evidenced by the 2015 "Miley-Gate" scandal where three company-grade pilots were initially stripped of their wings for "failing to maintain professional standards" due to referencing a Miley Cyrus song about drugs in their text messages.⁶⁵ As service members increase in rank and responsibility, the line blurs further, thus increasing the probability of failure according to Finkelstein's theory.

If Finkelstein's theory holds true, then many military leaders are destined for failure at some point in their careers based on DoD requirements. However, out of the average 930 general/flag officers that have led per year since 2003, only around one percent has incurred adverse action in any given year. Since this percentage is so low, other theories are investigated, such as that of David Dotlich and Peter Cairo.

11.2.2 Dotlich & Cairo

David Dotlich is a former Executive Vice President of Honeywell International and faculty member of Columbia University Business School Executive Education.⁶⁶ He and Peter Cairo theorize why corporate executive officers (CEOs) fail based on their personal experiences in the field and on psychologist Robert Hogan's work on leadership. Ultimately, they believe that eleven personality traits, called "derailers," account for executive leadership failure. They contend, "CEOs are more vulnerable than other leaders to these derailers."⁶⁷ They believe this is due to their "being in the spotlight, feeling responsible for the careers of thousands of employees, dealing with intense pressure for short-term results while investing in the long term, [and]

leading in an era of incredible speed and complexity.”⁶⁸ Dotlich’s and Cairo’s derailers are arrogance, melodrama, volatility, excessive caution, habitual distrust, aloofness, mischievousness, eccentricity, passive resistance, perfectionism, and an eagerness to please.⁶⁹

Although military leaders are in the spotlight with responsibility over hundreds-to-thousands of employees, Dotlich’s and Cairo’s theory does not appear to align with many, if any, of the studied senior military leaders. In fact, the opposite is apparent in several cases. Gen Stanley McChrystal and Adm William Fallon acted by providing information in an active and passionate manner, involving themselves, and taking calculated risks. Yet, both resigned before retirement due to controversial magazine articles.^{70,71,72} However, Dotlich’s and Cairo’s proposed leadership flaws were apparent in lower-level military leaders researched for this paper, but they are excluded due to scope. It is possible that their theory applies to lower levels of leadership, but these attributes are rare in senior leaders. There are very few other scholars of leadership failure, but many individual studies propose additional leadership failure characteristics.

11.2.3 Additional Theories

The additional theories included here are limited in scope; singular studies present new theories or hypotheses. These areas may have further research potential or represent novel approaches to an old problem.

Dr. Diane Chandler theorized that leadership dimensions, follower dimensions, and situational context dimensions interacting in a critical incident could result in unethical leadership behavior according to her paper in the *International Journal of Leadership Studies*. One of the leadership dimensions consists of “success stressors and personal imbalance,” which

encompasses the “Bathsheba Syndrome.” Based on the Old Testament story of King David’s affair with Bathsheba, leaders may have extramarital failures due to a greater access to resources and people, strained personal relationships, and a sense of entitlement.⁷³ Similar to Chandler’s research, a study published in *Psychological Science* by Joris Lammers, et al., linked greater power to higher incidences of infidelity, partially due to increased confidence.⁷⁴

Although this is not a case study into any connection between the Bathsheba Syndrome and researched leaders, one example is Brig Gen Richard Hassan. The IG determined he “wrongfully engaged in unprofessional relationships with female subordinate members of the Air Force, military and civilian,” “sexually harassed female subordinates,” “maltreated female subordinates under his command,” and “violated lawful general regulations.”⁷⁵ Considering that 18 percent of the researched leaders since 2000 engaged in direct sexual acts against military regulations, these theories are viable. However, various studies in the US population places the prevalence of extramarital affairs around 15 to 25 percent, with less than six percent occurring each year.^{76,77,78,79} Given the annual prevalence within the public population, a known rate of less than one percent per year for senior military officers is noteworthy.

Christian N. Thoroughgood, et al., in study published in the *Journal of Business Psychology*, tested the effects of gender stereotypes on leadership error perceptions.⁸⁰ Their main finding was that men who are in gender-typical roles (e.g. the military, construction, et cetera) and have job performance failures are viewed as less competent than women are in the same scenario. The authors found the opposite scenario was true as well. Since only three of the 72 leaders researched in-depth were female, this limited data set prevented further analysis. However, this theory may become more relevant as female military leaders increase in number.

11.3 Militaristic Failure Theories

In contrast with the executive failure theories, several theorists suggest reasons for overall military campaign failures. Dr. Eliot A. Cohen is a professor of strategic studies for several organizations, including Johns Hopkins University.⁸¹ Professor John Gooch teaches history at the University of Lancaster, England with prior work at Yale and the US Naval War College.⁸² Dr. Peter Feaver is a Bass Fellow at Duke University and professor of Political Science and Public Policy. Additionally, he was a Special Advisor to the White House for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform.⁸³

11.3.1 Cohen and Gooch

Cohen aptly noted in his book, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, “The people who get to the top do so because they possess certain institutionally desirable characteristics: They are cautious, they adhere to rules and regulations, they respect and accept authority, they obey their superiors, and they regard discipline and submission to authority as the highest virtues.”⁸⁴ Cohen also refuted how military failures are often explained: “The Man in the Dock” (single source error), “The Man on the Couch (naturally predestined to fail), “Military Mind” (collective incompetence), “Institutional Failure” (organizational error), and “Cultural Error” (societal incompetence). Through historical case studies, he then theorized that a failure to learn, anticipate, and/or adapt could lead to catastrophe.^{85,86} However, most of his studied cases involved organizations and the nation as a whole, which may not fully account for individual failures.

A notable individual example is the Commander of the 20th Air Force, Maj Gen Michael Carey, who participated in an exercise with Russia in “...regard to safeguarding nuclear

warheads during convoy operations.” During the exercise, he “engaged in inappropriate behavior,” which included his association with “foreign national women,” consumption of “alcohol every day on the trip,” and his rudeness to “both his fellow delegates and to his Russian hosts.”⁸⁷ Subsequently, leadership demoted him to the rank of brigadier general. This example conflicts with Cohen’s description of DoD leaders as respectful, disciplined, and cautious.⁸⁸

11.3.2 Feaver

Feaver expounded on the principal-agent theory within economics and Samuel Huntington’s civil-military relations model. The original principal-agent theory proposed that the principal (i.e. boss) cannot complete sufficient work, so the principal hires the agent (i.e. worker). However, the principal also cannot fully monitor the agent, so a relationship emerges between the two.⁸⁹ Feaver deemed his new theory, the “Agency Theory.” Because civilians are the key policymakers for the country and decide if/when the military may act, clashes may arise. Several characteristics may arise from this relationship: divergent preferences, information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazards, monitoring, preferences, working, and shirking. *Agency Theory* defines “working” as the military performing the civilians’ requirements as delineated and “shirking” as deviating from the required means, ways, or ends.⁹⁰

Although *Agency Theory* relates more toward military groups rather than individuals, the instances of individual leader visionary disconnect align due to conflict between civilian leaders and their military subordinates. As previously detailed, sensational magazine articles implied that General McChrystal and Admiral Fallon were subversive to their civilian leaders (although a later investigation did not substantiate the allegations against General McChrystal).^{91,92,93}

11.4 Corporate Failure Theories

Although some of the preceding theorists touched upon corporate failure theories in their work on executive and militaristic failures, two others theories on corporate failure are considered. Sydney Finkelstein, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew Campbell present one of these theories. Directors Jo Whitehead and Andrew Campbell are at the Strategic Management Centre at Ashridge Business School.⁹⁴ The other theory is presented by Dr. Jim Collins, who studies corporations and their leadership professionally. Previously he taught at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.⁹⁵

11.4.1 Collins

Collins contends that corporations transitionally decline to ultimate failure through five main stages: “hubris born of success,” “undisciplined pursuit of more,” “denial of risk and peril,” “grasping for salvation,” and “capitulation to irrelevance or death.”⁹⁶ During the first stage of decline, success insulates the corporation. The combination of success and distance from reality leads to arrogance, entitlement, and eventually a merit and ability overestimation. In the “undisciplined pursuit of more,” corporate leaders stray from disciplined decisions and make undisciplined actions. The corporation overreaches its capabilities. When negative data and external signals provide signs of distress, the corporation denies risk and peril (stage three). Leaders may dismiss factual data in favor of more positive statistics. The consequences of discarding factual data are denied. Once this stage occurs, the corporation begins a noticeable decline. Leaders may “grasp for salvation” by employing a visionary leader, undertaking an extreme transformation, acquiring “game-changing” resources, or implementing an untested new strategy. Although these efforts may provide some success, the damage usually capitulates to

“irrelevance or death.” In this last stage of corporate decline, employees abandon hope, sell out, and/or atrophy.⁹⁷ Collins summarized failure prevention with Winston Churchill’s commencement address, “This is the lesson: never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never – in nothing, great or small, large or petty – never give in except to convictions of honour and good sense. Never yield to force; never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy.”⁹⁸

Only a third of the known issues in 2000 to 2015 were performance related, and the vast majority of those were due to the leader not following regulations. The only two known cases in that time that could relate to Collins’ theory were due to the BLS attack.⁹⁹ However, there were several instances prior to 2000, especially during World War II.¹⁰⁰ Since less than three percent of the investigated cases are relatable to Collins’ theory, other theories are compared to the findings.

11.4.2 Finkelstein, Whitehead, and Campbell

These three authors theorized that the brain uses pattern recognition and emotional tagging to process information. Misleading experiences and misleading prejudgments lead to faulty pattern recognition. The idea that “generals are usually fighting the last war” falls under the category of misleading experiences, while a misleading prejudgment makes everything look like a nail to a man with a hammer.¹⁰¹ Inappropriate self-interest and inappropriate attachments can cause error in emotional tagging. To counter these errors, the authors propose four safeguards: experience and data, group debate and challenge, governance, and monitoring.¹⁰²

Similar to Collins, only the two BLS cases are directly related to conflict since 2000. It is possible that the visionary disconnect cases occurred due to “fighting the last war.” However, it

appears that in each case, the senior officers did attempt to (correctly or incorrectly) elicit and participate in group debate and challenge. Brig Gen Billy Mitchell, Vice Adm Gerald Bogan, Adm William Blandy, Adm Louis Denfeld, Gen Douglas MacArthur, Adm William Fallon, and Gen Stanley McChrystal all vocalized their beliefs, to their detriment.

12 Conclusion

While some senior military officers took a stand for their controversial beliefs, others faced criminal prosecution for wrongdoing. Through this research project, a database of all known military senior leadership failure was compiled, evaluated, and analyzed against leading theories on failure. Three main types of military leadership failures were identified: ethical/moral, performance, and visionary disconnect. The vast majority of failures from 2000 to 2015 were ethical/moral related, and of those, most were of a sexual nature. This conflicts with the preceding 74 years as well as many of the leading theories on executive, corporate, and military operation failures. Several recommendations are presented to assist emerging leaders in avoiding failure, helping those affected by failure cope, and ultimately create a more ethical and effective leadership pool for the warfighter.

12.1 Recommendations

Although the ethical/moral failures are disconcerting, especially with the rise in documented prevalence, they are not insurmountable. The number of documented extramarital affairs at the senior officer level is within the bounds of typical for the American populace (although 'typical' does not justify the action). While training is often the panacea for many military-related issues, here it is still advisable in addition to zero tolerance policies. Military members and their families face enormous challenges, and there are many resources available for

handling deployments, suicidal thoughts, disabilities, or other challenges. But how many resources are available to senior leaders on managing a relationship with some of the greatest demands in the nation? What training is provided to ensure senior leaders understand the line between their personal and professional lives when both intertwine daily? Providing mandatory training and counseling may help identify and resolve issues before inappropriate action occurs.

Similarly, senior leaders may not fully grasp changes in their subordinates' generation. What might have been excusable behavior for senior officers when they were young is no longer excusable, and likewise, what was taboo may now be acceptable. As late as 2013, a senior leader sent a racially inappropriate email.¹⁰³ Sexual assault/harassment incidents are increasing each year, and the SAPR office believes the trend is due solely to increased reporting. The repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT), the Supreme Court decision to recognize same-sex marriages, and transgendered employees will challenge senior leaders.^{104,105} These cultural and societal changes, without proper training, may create a situation where the senior officer believes he or she is acting appropriately, when, in reality, he or she is not.

Performance-related issues are a balancing act. The DoD holds military leadership responsible for success and environment domination, which Finkelstein contends is detrimental to success for executives. In addition, the senior officers whose actions contradicted Dotlich's and Cairo's corporate failure theory were the most likely to fail. Visionary disconnects in the military appeared or were outright subversive, and thus, those senior officers received disciplinary action even though they displayed traits inconsistent with corporate failure. While there are many legitimate paths for vocalization, such as the chain of command or inspector generals, the media is not one of those outlets. Thus, a new framework for military leadership failure cause is necessary.

As shown in Section 10, the years with above-average numbers of general/flag officer membership immediately preceded years with the highest adverse personnel action. This trend should be monitored for continuation and potential correlation/causation analysis, especially in relation to periods of conflict conclusion. If the trend continues, it suggests some personnel actions are a form of a reduction-in-force. While accountability is still essential, this method may not be the most effective method for reaching staffing requirements.

Considering the mental and physical health of these leaders post-disciplinary action is also of importance, especially given the diagnosed cases of PTSD and GAD associated with forced terminations in other career fields.¹⁰⁶ The appropriate medical organization should study whether military service members are impacted similarly, and if so, appropriate post-termination support should be provided as part of any remaining health benefits.

12.2 Conclusions

Many of the executive, military conflict, and corporate failure theories do not adequately address the causes of senior military leadership failure; however, they do partially address the causes below the general/flag officer level. This research determined some general/flag officers incur adverse personnel actions due to military-specific culture and regulations, such as those on extramarital affairs, leadership accountability, and the all-encompassing role of military life upon the leader's personal life. Future senior leaders can avoid pitfalls by acknowledging the challenges and changes that power brings, incorporating regular self-assessments of their personal and professional lives, staying current with generational differences, and balancing authority and responsibility.

While failure is often painful, it offers many lessons for those who chose to study it. Amid worldwide tensions and budgetary reductions, the United States cannot afford to lose experienced leaders as previously lost, such as a Vice Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,¹⁰⁷ Commander of US Forces Afghanistan,¹⁰⁸ or even a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.¹⁰⁹ Acknowledging failure and its warning signs can enable open discussions on its prevention. The unfortunate case of Gen David Petraeus' extramarital affair and classified information leak alongside other fallen leaders can help develop tomorrow's general/flag officers, as well as civilian leaders. Although a few additional theories are presented as to why senior military leaders fail, additional research is required. As Leo Tolstoy aptly noted in *Anna Karenina*, "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."¹¹⁰ Likewise, successful military leaders all demonstrate similar characteristics, but failure mechanisms are far more complex.

Notes

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² United States District Court, Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, *United States of America v. David Howell Petraeus, Bill of Information*, 3 March 2015, 1.

³ United States District Court, Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, *United States of America v. David Howell Petraeus, Plea Agreement*, 3 March 2015, 2.

⁴ Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct: General T. Michael Moseley*, 10 July 2009. Document is now redacted.

⁵ Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: General William E. Ward*, 26 June 2012. Document is now redacted.

⁶ Inspector General of the Air Force, *Report of Investigation (S6567P): Maj Gen Thomas J. Fiscus*, October 2004. Document is now redacted.

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¹⁸ Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, *Report of Investigation: Tailhook 91 – Part 2, Events of the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium*, 12 April 1993.

¹⁹ Eric Schmitt, “New Navy Scandal: An Admiral Guilty of Sex Harassment,” *The New York Times*, 9 December 1995.

²⁰ Dana Priest and Bradley Graham, “Defense Dept. Understated Ralston Affair,” *The Washington Post*, 7 June 1997.

²¹ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2909, *Professional and Unprofessional Relationships*, 1 May 1999, 2.

²² Ibid., 6.

²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 134, “General Article,” accessed 30 January 2016.

²⁵ Diane J. Chalder, “The Perfect Storm of Leader’ Unethical Behavior: A Conceptual Framework,” *International Journal of Leadership Studies* 5, no. 1 (2009): 69-93.

²⁶ Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, *Army Leadership*, 8 March 2007, 6.

²⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013, xvi.

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14 Appendix A: Reviewed Cases

Last, First M.

Allen, Terry
Army, Peter
Arnold, Mark C.
Baldwin, James
Baucom, David
Blair, Dennis C.
Blandy, William H. P.
Bogan, Gerald P.
Bohn, John J.
Boykin, William G.
Britt, Timothy B.
Brooks, Vincent K.
Brown, Lloyd D.
Byrnes, Kevin P.
Carey, Michael J.
Carpenter, Raymond
Cartwright, James E.
Caslen, Robert L.
Catton, John J.
Cho, John
Dallager, John D.
Denfeld, Louis E.
Donahue, Scott F.
Dugan, Michael
Dunleavy, Richard
Elliott, Richard G.
Fallon, William
Fil, Joseph F.
Fiscus, Thomas J.
Fredendall, Lloyd R.
French, Kristin K.
Fuller, Peter
Gaouette, Charles M.
Giardina, Timothy M.
Goldfein, Stephen M.
Griffith, Thomas R.
Gurganus, Charles M.
Hale, David
Harding, Edwin F.
Harrison, Michael T.



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

Hassan, Richard H.
Heinrich, Mark F.
Horton, Ron
Huntoon, David H.
Huxtable, Stephen L.
Jones, Alan W.
Karpinski, Janis L.
Kelso, Frank B.
Kiley, Kevin C.
Kimmel, Husband E.
Koster, Samuel W.
Kraft, Terry
Landrum, Eugene M.
Lucas, John P.
MacArthur, Douglas
Macke, Richard C.
MacKelvie, Jay
Maher, John J., III
Mascolo, Eugene L.
Mashiko, Susan K.
McChrystal, Stanley A.
McKiernan, David D.
Miller, Charlotte L.
Miller, Michael
Miller, Henry J. F.
Mitchell, Billy
Morrill, Arthur, III
Moseley, T. Michael
Mulholland, Sean P.
Mulholland, John F.
Naughton, Richard F.
Nesbitt, William T.
Newell, Robert
Newman, Robert B.
Oliver, Daniel T.
O'Reilly, Patrick J.
Padilla, Frank J.
Petraeus, David H.
Pimpo, David
Post, James



Last, First M.

Ralston, Joseph W.
Rice, Lawrence
Richardson, James O.
Riggs, John M.
Roberts, Bryan T.
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr.
Schweitzer, Martin P.
Shinseki, Eric K.
Short, Walter C.
Sinclair, Jeffrey A.
Smith, Larry G.
Smith, Ralph C.
Stavridis, James G.
Stufflebeem, John D.
Sturdevant, Gregg A.
Sutton, Peter U.
Tindal, Ralph L.
Uhrich, David C.
Ward, William E.
Ward, Orlando
Watson, Leroy
Weeks, Jon
Weightman, George W.
Williams, Sam
Wisecup, James P.
Woerner, Frederick F., Jr.
Young, George

15 Appendix B: Additional Charts







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